Abstract-Vehicular networking enables new safety applications that aim at improving roads safety. Because of their direct relation to driver's safety, this goal can only be achieved if vehicular networking is based on a technology that is robust against malicious attackers. Therefore, security mechanisms such as authentication are proposed. However, security comes at a cost in terms of computational and communication overhead. For example, a signature and certificate are appended to every beacon sent, which generates an extra load on the network. Moreover, most of the safety applications require a perfect awareness of the vehicle's surroundings to perform adequately. To represent such awareness, the Awareness Quality is used to indicate the current level of awareness of the vehicle. This metric was previously used by the Decentralized Congestion Control community to improve channel usage. In this paper, we use the Awareness Quality to investigate the impact of security on cooperative awareness in VANET. Then, we apply this metric to the mechanism of certificate omission, and provide extensive simulation results. The attributes of Awareness Quality metrics enable us to investigate the behavior of certificate omission schemes with a precision that was not provided by aggregate metrics. This enables us to show that congestion-based certificate omission with a quadratic adaption function is the most effective scheme among existing certificate omission schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a decade now, vehicular networking has received great attention by academia, industry, and politics. It brings the promise to make our driving safer, more efficient and environment-friendly, and last but not least, also more comfortable. These goals can only be achieved if vehicular networking is based on a technology that is robust against malicious attackers, and this need was stressed very early in publications like [1] .
A central aspect is authentication and integrity protection for messages. It should be ensured that only valid vehicles can send messages that other vehicles will accept as genuine, and that attackers cannot modify or tamper with sent messages. Both the IEEE 1609.2 standard and its corresponding counterpart for Europe, ETSI TS 103 097, foresee the use of digital signatures using Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) and the NISTp256 curve as cryptographic basis. Furthermore, both standards foresee a public key infrastructure where Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue digital certificates for vehicles that attest the validity of vehicle's key pairs.
The details of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are rather complex, especially due to the fact that both privacy and nonrepudiation need to be guaranteed, but for the issue discussed in this paper this is of lesser importance. We can just conclude that vehicles own asymmetric key pairs and certificates, and use those keys to attach signatures and certificates to messages.
This attachment has a direct influence on communication reliability. The size of this added security payload is 65 bytes for the signature and 140 bytes for a certificate. As [2] , [3] discuss, such an increase of message size will lead to an increase of packet collisions -especially on a congested channel. Both papers suggest that it is not a clever strategy to attach a certificate to every single message.
Once a receiver A obtained a certificate of a neighboring vehicle B, further certificates attached to subsequent messages of B are redundant and can be omitted. However, as vehicular networks typically use broadcast communication to an unspecified set of neighboring vehicles, A has generally no means to know whether all receivers already know its certificate. So if A omits a certificate from a message, this creates the risk that a receiver not knowing the certificate cannot validate the public key of A, and then needs to discard the message. This creates a security-induced "cryptographic packet loss" in contrast to network-induced "network packet loss". Attaching less certificates to subsequent messages of A increases the cryptographic packet loss while reducing network packet loss. Attaching certificates to every single message removes cryptographic packet loss while potentially increasing network packet loss.
The question we address in this paper is the search for an optimal strategy that balances this trade-off to achieve a minimum overall packet loss. Previous approaches like [2] , [4] , [3] have investigated different approaches for certificate omission that will be discussed in the next sections. They have, however, one significant drawback. Their evaluation is based on the number of packets that is lost, and not on the impact that this has on application performance. One notable exception is [5] , [6] that looks at one specific application to investigate how many crashes different omission schemes can help to prevent.
In this paper we take a more general approach that is using so-called awareness quality as a metric to compare different strategies. Awareness quality, as introduced in [7] looks at the information that a vehicle has about a specific driving situation based on the messages it received. It compares the known positions of vehicles as reported in received messages with the ground truth, i.e., the real positions of vehicles. The more this deviates (e.g., because of lost messages), the more inaccurate reactions of various applications that rely on cooperative awareness among vehicles will be.
By using this metric we are able to predict which certificate omission strategy works best for a variety of applications.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss the related work in Section II. Then, Section III presents the Awareness Quality metric, and describes its analytical model. Section IV details the simulation setup and discusses the simulation results. Finally, Section V draws conclusions and presents future work.
II. RELATED WORK
To analyze the cost of security mechanisms, the network packet loss is often used. Indeed, the larger message size due to signature and certificate increases the probability of collision, and thus of packet loss. For example, Haas et al. [8] analyzed the impact of two authentication schemes, namely ECDSA and TESLA, on network packet loss. Likewise, Papadimitratos et al. [6] investigated the reliability of communication and the processing overhead at each node.
However, even if the network packet loss is a relevant indicator to analyze the communication overhead of security mechanisms, it does not reflect the impact on the safety application. Therefore, safety metrics such as the percentage of crashes were proposed [5] , [6] . In [9] , the braking distance is used as a metric to analyze the impact of authentication on safety applications. The proposed concept is to convert signature verification time into braking distance, to give a concrete example of the impact of security.
However, the braking distance is not an appropriated metric for all safety applications. For example, lane merging, platooning, blind spot notification, or intersection collision avoidance, do not deal with braking distance, but require a perfect knowledge of the vehicle's surrounding. Therefore, another metric to assess the effect of security is required. We differentiate from the aforementioned work by proposing to use Awareness Quality to assess the impact of security. The Awareness Quality was originally proposed by Schmidt et al. [7] to dynamically adjust Distributed Congestion Control (DCC) parameters such as transmission power [10] .
III. AWARENESS QUALITY
Periodically exchanging Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) 1 establishes up-to-date awareness of all surrounding vehicles and their status. Awareness in the road traffic context refers to the relation between knowledge of vehicles that are stored in a vehicle's neighbor table and the knowledge of vehicles that should be stored. The corresponding awareness requirements depend on the active safety applications [11] , and of course on the network load, i.e. the acceptable awareness varies significantly under low and high load. Under low load, the awareness should be equal or close to 100% within the transmission range. Under high load, there should be a 1 Also known as Basic Safety Message (BSM) or one-hop safety beacon. suitable trade-off, where the limited communication resources should be focussed to achieve high awareness in the most safety-critical area(s). For example, on highways, the vehicles travelling in the same direction should be known. In urban areas, especially at intersections, the cross-traffic should be known since they pose the highest risks there. To quantify the achievement of these different requirements, a more finegrained awareness metric is defined in the following. To compute the Awareness Quality (AQL) each vehicle reports the level of awareness as the fraction of known vehicles based on a given validity. This validity may increase with the distance to the concerned vehicles. For the sake of simplicity, this can be assumed to increase linearly.
A. Notation
First of all, areas of different awareness requirements around receiving vehicles are defined. Simplified, these areas are rings. The most safety-relevant ones are the rings between 0 and 100 m, 100 and 200 m, and 200 and 300 m, as shown in Figure 1 . Safety areas A k are assumed to be circular with a size of
with k denoting the identifier of the area, which are assumed to have equidistant radiuses, i.e.
with the initial radius a 1 being 100 m in the previously described example.
At time T and for a certain vehicle i, the awareness within area k is defined as
with V T k (i) denoting the set of vehicles being within area k (i.e. the ground truth) and N T k (i) denoting the set of discovered neighbors within area k. Note that the intersection
is required to eliminate the vehicles that are still in the neighbor table but have actually moved out of the respective area. This ensures that the fraction is always less or equal to one.
To establish the set N T k (i), we define the following constraints. Vehicle j is a neighbor of i within area k at time T , with d ij = distance(i, j) and the k-th safety area:
In order to measure the Awareness Quality over time, the awareness is summed up over all vehicles and divided by the number of all vehicles for all time steps t ∈ T , i.e.
AQL(T, k)
For AQL(T, k), the number of probes in the nominator is exactly the same as in the denominator. As these probes Awareness 
B. Remarks
There are various reasons why the Awareness can be less than one. For example, a low penetration rate degrades this ratio significantly. However in this paper, it is assumed that the penetration rate is close to 100%, otherwise high channel load may not be reached. Therefore, only communicationrelated issues are considered. In high load situations, packet loss occurs due to interference. The packet loss may even occur at low distances between sender and receiver which would most likely prevent active safety applications from working properly.
C. Example
An example for the Awareness for a single vehicle is depicted in Figure 1 . Six vehicles n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n 6 take part in this scene. Assuming n 6 just came into range of n 1 and no CAM has been received at the measurement time T = 1. There are three safety areas A 1 , A 2 , A 3 defined, equidistantly separated by a 1 = 100 m.
(Awareness
Note that the reason for not knowing vehicle n 6 could be also due to a packet collision or increased signal attenuation by the vehicles in-between.
For more explanation on field trial implementations of this metric, the reader is referred to [12] .
D. Impact of Certificate Omission
Originally, the AQL had been established aiming at the comparison of approaches to improve channel usage. Thus, effects of packet loss, lower transmission power or higher message intervals on the set of neighbors (N T k (i)) have been investigated. The constraints whether to know a neighbor or not only depends on whether the information has been received or not. Security considerations like presence of signatures and/or certificates have not been taken into consideration, which requires a separate analysis. So, in the following section, the impact of certificate omission will be discussed.
IV. AWARENESS QUALITY IN CERTIFICATE OMISSION SCHEME

A. Certificate Omission Schemes
We conduct a simulation study to evaluate the use of Awareness Quality (AQL) for the assessment of the following certificate omission schemes:
• No omission of certificates (NoOm): This scheme serves as a baseline as it performs no omission.
• Periodic omission of certificates (POoC) [3] : The idea of the POoC is to add the certificate every n beacons. 2 We evaluate two certificate periods of 3 seconds and 10 seconds.
• Neighbor-based certificate omission (NbCO) [2] : This scheme considers the context of a vehicle in the omission decision. The idea of NbCO is to only attach the certificate to beacons if there is a change in the neighbor table.
• Congestion-based certificate omission (CbCO) [4] : This scheme considers the load of the communication channel as the guiding metric. If the communication channel is free, there is no need to omit certificates to reduce the load on the channel. And if the communication channel is congested, then the communication load is reduced by aggressively omitting certificates. We evaluate two functions, which are used to adapt the omission frequency based on an implicit channel model and the neighbor table of vehicles: quadratic and linear.
B. Simulation Setup and Assumptions
The simulation is based on the JiST/SWANS [13] software with extensions by Ulm University. 3 The simulation environment provides 802.11p radio simulation and a realistic vehicular mobility model called STRAW [14] , which uses map data from the U.S. Census Bureau. This simulation package allows us to efficiently simulate scenarios with a high density of vehicles [15] . We use a 3 km by 3 km urban city map in Suffolk County, U.S.A., which is the same scenario as used in previous research in omission schemes [2] , [4] .
In our simulation we consider only the transfer of onehop beacon messages over one radio channel. While onehop beacon messages will not be the only safety messages, 2 called certificate period in the original paper 3 Website: http://www.vanet.info we assume that these messages will dominate the load. The configuration of the 802.11p communication channel is set to 6 MBit/s with a fixed transmission power of 20 dB. The basic parameters for our simulation are in line with previous works by Schoch et.al [2] and IEEE 1609.2 [16] . A summary of relevant parameters is given in Table I . For the format of beacon messages we follow the Basic Safety Message (BSM) format as specified in SAE J2735 [17] . We do not consider any optional Part II attributes of the BSM format or optional parts of the 1609.2 message format. The security services specified in IEEE 1609.2 offer different options for the cryptographic additions to messages. From these options we selected the compressed representation of NIST P-256 keys and signatures. We do not consider certificate chains in this study, but we note that certificates chains would increase the benefit of certificate omission as the crypto payload would get even larger. A summarized description of the cryptographic additions to our simulated messages is included in Table II . Adding the 45 bytes BSM and 5 bytes for headers in the payload to the cryptographic material, the total size of one beacon message is 255 bytes with certificate and 115 bytes if the certificate is omitted.
Beacons are sent every 100 milliseconds, as suggested by SAE J2735 [17] . The lifetime of beacon messages in the neighbor table of vehicles is fixed at 150 milliseconds. If the signature of a beacon cannot be verified, i.e. due to a missing certificate, the beacon is discarded. We refer to packets lost due to unverifiability as cryptographic packet loss (CPL) [4] . The sample rate for the collection of AQL measurements is fixed at 1 beacon cycle period, which is 100 milliseconds in our scenario. To test the efficiency of omission schemes under high loads, we scale the number of vehicles in the simulation scenario between 100 and 1500 vehicles on a 3 km x 3 km mixed road network. We further specify two load scenarios:
• Low density: 300 vehicles, 33 vehicles/km We expect the rate of uncoordinated pseudonym changes to be low enough to not be a relevant factor for the bandwidth optimization of beaconing services. Coordinated protocols for pseudonym changes, e.g. MixZones [18] , might exhibit similar conditions as the initial seconds of our simulations.
C. Simulation Results and Discussion
1) Average AQL Measurements:
We start by investigating awareness quality (AQL) measurement over multiple rings of safety areas. As described in Section III and illustrated in Figure 1 , we specify ring shaped areas around vehicles in segments of 100 m width [12] . The AQL measurement are calculated as the average over all vehicles in the scenario and over the whole 60 seconds of simulated time of the scenario. We collect measurements for NbCO, two variants of POoC, using a period of 3 and 10 for the omission scheme, and two variants of CbCO, using a linear and a quadratic adaption function. As a baseline we also measure the AQL for the NoOm scheme, which performs no omission.
In the low density scenario ( Figure 2 ) the AQL starts out at almost 100% in the safety critical area up to 100 m around the vehicle. The AQL then gradually decreases with the distance of the rings from the vehicle until signal propagation attributes cause severe drops in the rings between 600 m and 900 m distance. AQL finally converges to 0% around the 1000 m ring. The baseline NoOm scheme stands out in this scenario as the only scheme with a reduced AQL compared to all omission schemes. This illustrates that even in this scenario with low density of vehicles we do see the negative effect of increased packet collisions due to consistently larger beacons.
The same scenario in a high density configuration (Figure 3) shows this effect more visibly. The increase of packet loss decreases the AQL very quickly. None of the schemes manages to achieve an overall AQL above 70% in the safety relevant ring up to a distance of 300 m. At the same time it is clearly visible that the various omission schemes show different scaling behavior in such a scenario. The NbCO and Overall, these measurements match expected results from previous investigations of AQL [19] and certificate omission schemes [20] . To investigate the scalability problem in further detail we simulate the AQL in function of the number of vehicles in the scenario. Figure 4 shows the corresponding graphs for all schemes in the safety critical ring of 0 m to 100 m around vehicles. The AQL measurements show very robust performance for all schemes in this area, which confirms the absence of regressions in all these schemes with respect to proper operation in this most critical area.
In Figure 5 the same scenario for the ring from 200 m to 300 m shows more diversified results. The region up to a distance of 300 m around a vehicle is not considered to be safety critical but still safety relevant [12] . Like in Figure 3 , we see decreasing performance for the POoC3, NbCO and NoOm schemes under higher load in Figure 5 .
2) Time Series of AQL Measurements:
The results presented so far in Figures 2 -5 illustrate a scalability problem of not using a certificate omission and of degraded performance of some certificate omission schemes in scenarios with high densities of vehicles. But based on these measurements it is hard to identify the cause of these differences. In the preceding Figures we only see highly averaged AQL measurements, which got calculated as a combination of samples collected over all vehicles in the scenario and over the whole 60 seconds of simulated time of the scenario. Previous research around certificate omission based on packet loss statistics faced similar problems. Even if the window of time that is used for the generation of measurements is small, the fundamental problem remains that we work with aggregated data.
The use of AQL as a metric enables us to avoid aggregation of measurements over time. Based on the sample rate of the AQL measurements it is possible to present AQL values as a time series of measurements. This is possible because AQL can report exact awareness quality values at any given point in time, something that is not possible for packet delivery statistics. Figure 6 shows time series of AQL measurements, which are computed as an average over all vehicles in the scenario. Since no averaging takes place in the time domain we can see meaningful results at any given time in the simulation, even at very early stages. For better readability of the analysis we only show the initial 200 beacon periods of the simulation in Figure 6 . A beacon period in our simulation scenario is specified as a fixed period of 100 ms. A beacon period of 200 represents 20 seconds of simulated time. We choose the AQL sampling rate to match the beacon period. The scenario uses the high density configuration of 1500 vehicles and we use a ring of 300 m width from 0 m to 300 m distance around the vehicle in order to cover the entire security relevant area around the vehicle.
The baseline performance is again represented by the NoOm scheme. We reiterate again that not using any omission at all is clearly detrimental to the overall performance of a secure beaconing service under high load. We notice that the NbCO scheme initially performs almost identical to the NoOm scheme. This suggests that it does indeed operate almost identically as the NoOm scheme. This behavior is explicable through the high amount of unknown neighbors in the early stages of the simulation. The existence of unknown neighbors in NbCO block omissions of certificates, which increases the load on the channel and the number of packet collisions. The NbCO scheme fails to reduce the load on the channel at a time when it would be most important to back off. Consequently it takes a comparatively long time for NbCO to escape from the default behavior of NoOm.
The POoC3 scheme, which we previously identified as the third scheme with significantly degraded scalability under high load, shows performance characteristics that are independent of the behavior of NoOm and NbCO. The initial reaction time of POoC3 is competitive with other schemes, but POoC3 quickly stabilizes around an AQL level of approximately 70%. This indicates that this fixed omission works well during the initial pressure of exchanging many certificates, but during later stages it is obvious that this non-adaptive strategy leaves room for better scalability. A very notable difference can be seen between POoC3 and POoC10. The latter scheme shows very good overall scalability, matching the CbCO schemes. However in the early stages of the simulation we can identify obvious problems in the reaction time of this scheme. The period of 9 omissions for every inclusion of a certificate is clearly visible in this figure. The AQL is clearly impacted by this long period of omissions. Nevertheless, once the vehicles know the certificates of nearby vehicles, the scalability of POoC10 is on par with the CbCO schemes, which use the available bandwidth optimally among the tested schemes.
To understand the impact of verifiable packets, in particular with respect to the POoC schemes, it is useful to look at the same results without discarding unverifiable packets. Figure 7 shows the resulting graph for such an analysis. In this figure we also show an omission scheme that omits all certificates, called AllOm. Under normal circumstances this would of course lead to an AQL of 0%, because certificates never get exchanged between vehicles. But it is useful to see this scheme here as an upper bound.
We see NoOm and NbCO almost unaffected by cryptographic packet loss (CPL), which indicates that these schemes are dominated by regular network packet loss (NPL). In fact we can see that the scalability attributes of all schemes eventually get dominated by NPL effects, as the AQL measurements converge to the same values as in Figure 6 . But the reaction time at the beginning of the simulation shows critical differences. We see that the "stairs effect" of POoC10 as seen previously is eliminated if we do not consider CPL. Instead, we see almost optimal behavior approaching that of AllOm, with the exception of occasionally dropping down due to the inclusion of certificates in every 10th beacon cycle. The CbCO schemes notably perform very similar to POoC10 in this Figure, indicating that the pure NPL tradeoff is as effective as POoC10. This is intuitively clear, since the CbCO schemes are algorithmically limited to behavior like POoC10 under high load [4] .
3) Optimal Certificate Omission Scheme: The ability to zoom in on the early stages of the simulation and to see exact quality measurements at the selected sampling rate allowed us to derive a much better understanding of the behavior of the schemes. But so far we could not see useful information about the behavior of the two CbCO schemes, beyond the observation that the schemes perform very well. In Figure 8 we zoom in even further by reducing the observation window to the first 30 beacon periods, which is equivalent to 3 seconds of simulation time at our selected beaconing interval of 100 ms. Again we notice the "stairs effect" of POoC10 and the very similar behavior of the NoOm and NbCO schemes. Interestingly the POoC3 scheme performs very well at this early stage of the scenario, indicating that it strikes a good balance between reducing load on the communication channel and disseminating certificates to reduce CPL. We can also clearly see the oscillation of POoC3 on a period of 3. The two CbCO schemes seem to exhibit a similar oscillation pattern as POoC3 at this stage of the simulation. The CbCO schemes do not use a fixed omission though. The observed behavior can be explained by the fact that the CbCO schemes are adaptive POoC schemes. The schemes start out with empty neighbor tables, indicating that each vehicle is free to include certificates in beacons, since the channel is assumed to be free. With the exception of POoC10 all schemes perform similarly up to beacon period 6. Ignoring POoC10, the performance is tightly bounded by the NoOm and POoC3 schemes, indicating that we see very few omissions at this point. After the 6 beacon period mark we see a split into two groups. While NoOm and NbCO remain stagnant, we see the CbCO schemes perform similarly well as the fixed POoC3 scheme, indicating that these schemes continue to act similarly. The explanation for this can be found in the neighbor tables that slowly build up in the vehicles and gradually adjust the omission period to higher levels. Neighboring vehicles that send unverifiable beacons are not added to the neighbor table, leading the CbCO schemes to keep the omission rate at a low value. With this behavior the CbCO schemes apparently strike the best balance between NPL and CPL. Starting out with no omission and gradually increasing the omission rate only if two conditions are met:
• There are many neighbor vehicles around the vehicle, implying that the communication channel is congested,
• The neighbors send verifiable beacons, implying that the vehicles know each other and certificate omission will not have a negative effect.
A remaining uncertainty is the competitive behavior of the two CbCO scheme amongst each other. To find an answer to this question we isolate the two graphs for linear CbCO and quadratic CbCO in Figure 9 . We know that these two schemes converge to very similar scalability properties overall. In terms of reaction time we can however identify small differences. The use of a more aggressive quadratic adaption function leads to better reaction times in a situation with many new neighbors Finally, with the availability of AQL as a fine-grained and exact way to investigate edge-cases of certificate omission, we show another edge case that indicates CbCO quad to be superior to CbCo linear. In Figure 10 we show the first 30 beacon periods of a scenario with a low density of cars. It is expected that all schemes perform very well in this scenario, with Figure 4 suggesting that we should see AQL values around 98%. But we can see that some schemes struggle in the first couple of beacon periods. The NoOm and NbCO perform best in this scenario, followed by CbCO quad, POoC3, We conclude that, thanks to AQL measurements we could identify quadratic CbCO as the preferred choice in high load scenarios and as a near optimal choice for low load scenarios. Our results are summarized in Table III. V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK Security of vehicular networking is mandatory to provide robust safety applications. It is important to investigate the impact of security mechanisms on safety applications. In this paper, we analyzed the impact of certificate omission mechanisms from an application-level perspective. We used Awareness Quality to compare five omission schemes, and concluded that the Congestion-based certificate omission scheme with quadratic adaption function is the best-suited for safety applications. It provides the optimal combination of awareness quality, scalability and reactivity.
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This work also demonstrated that Awareness Quality allows precise measurements of the scenarios' state at any given time. This helps to expose the intrinsic behavior of the studied schemes. We encourage security researchers to apply this metric to assess the impact of security mechanisms on cooperative safety applications. We also hope to see complementary work on top-down approaches that consider application requirements during protocol design.
As a future work, we plan to test certificate omission in Field Operational Tests within the PRESERVE project. If realistic tests confirm the effectiveness of certificate omission, we hope to find this technique included in future Distributed Congestion Control proposals.
